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T
he Federal Reserve significantly increased bank
reserves and the monetary base after Lehman
Brothers announced on September 15, 2008, that it
had filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The Fed
took additional steps toward quantitative easing (QE) on
March 18, 2009, when it announced that it would purchase
up to $1.725 trillion in mortgage-backed securities and
government and agency debt. Recent speculation that the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) may purchase
an additional large quantity of government debt to stimulate
economic growth, increase employment, and prevent defla-
tion has prompted considerable debate over the effective-
ness of additional quantitative easing (QE2). This synopsis
analyzes some of the central issues in this debate.
One key issue is whether additional large-scale securities
purchases by the Fed would cause interest rates to decline
significantly. Recently Gagnon et al.1 used several methods
to investigate the effect of the FOMC’s announced securities
purchases ($1.725 trillion) on the 10-year Treasury yield,
which they estimate to be in the range of 38 to 82 basis
points. Some might conjecture that an FOMC commitment
to purchase, say, an additional $1 trillion in securities could
reduce the 10-year yield by a comparable amount (22 to
48 basis points). These estimates may be too large and
need to be confirmed by further research. Moreover, some
commentators (e.g., Narayana Kocherlakota, president of
the Minneapolis Fed2) have suggested QE2’s effect on
Treasury yields may be “muted” because financial markets
are functioning much better than they were in the spring
of 2009.
There is another reason that the effect on interest rates
could be small. Banks are currently holding about $1 trillion
in excess reserves rather than making loans and increasing
the supply of credit to the non-banking segment of the
credit market. It is possible—perhaps even likely—that
almost all of any increase in the supply of credit associated
with QE2 simply would be held by banks as excess reserves.
If so, the effect of QE2 on interest rates could be small and
limited to an announcement effect—the effect associated
with the FOMC’s announcement—independent of the
effect of the FOMC’s actions on the credit supply.
Even if QE2 did affect interest rates, many believe that
the effect on output or employment would be small. For
example, Charles Plosser, president of the Philadelphia Fed
and a nonvoting member of the FOMC, recently suggested
that “[I]t is difficult…to see how additional asset purchases
by the Fed, even if they move interest rates on long-term
bonds down by 10 or 20 basis points, will have much impact
on the near-term outlook for employment.”3 One reason is
that even in normal times, investment spending is not par-
ticularly responsive to changes in interest rates: Investment
spending depends more on the economic outlook. Conse  -
quently, some analysts believe that reducing interest rates
modestly from their already historically low levels is unlikely
to stimulate aggregate demand: Little effect on aggregate
demand implies a corresponding small effect on output
and, hence, employment.
Furthermore, even if QE2 significantly affected output,
its effect on employment would likely be somewhat smaller
than usual for two reasons. First, at least some of the current
unemployment is likely to be structural (i.e., there is a mis-
match between the skills of the unemployed and the skill
needs of employers). There is little monetary policy can
do about structural unemployment. Second, employment
growth has been particularly sluggish in the previous two
recessions, suggesting that post-recession employment
dynamics differ greatly from those before the late 1980s,
which suggests that the labor market has fundamentally
changed. Hence post-recession employment growth could
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The effect of QE2 on inflation or inflation expectations
is also uncertain. According to modern macroeconomic
theory, inflation is determined by (i) economic agents’
inflation expectations and (ii) the gap between actual and
potential output. Currently, the estimated gap between
actual and potential output is negative and large. Conse  -
quently, in order to affect inflation by the gap mechanism,
QE2 would have to significantly increase output relative to
potential, but (as noted above) the effect on output is
questionable.
Based on statements by Chairman Ben Bernanke and
other FOMC members there is widespread belief that the
FOMC’s longer-run inflation objective is about 2 percent,
well above both current inflation and market-based meas-
ures of inflation expectations. Hence it seems unlikely that
QE2 would raise inflation expectations unless the FOMC
signaled that it was seeking inflation above the implicit 2
percent objective, at least in the short run.4
Some analysts and market participants believe inflation
is the consequence of excessive money growth. That is,
excessive money growth increases inflation independent
of the size of the output gap or inflation expectations.
Growth of the M1 and M2 monetary aggregates accelerated
sharply after the Fed began QE in September 2008, but
then declined as banks increased their holdings of excess
reserves. If banks decide to hold most or all of QE2 as
excess reserves, there would be no corresponding increase
in the money supply and, consequently, no increase in
inflation. Some analysts are already concerned about the
potential inflation consequences of the Fed’s previous QE
measures. To the extent that QE2 would exacerbate those
concerns, it could raise inflation expectations. However, it
is questionable whether inflation expectations would rise
appreciably without either a corresponding increase in
actual inflation or the FOMC signaling a higher inflation
objective.
Finally, it should be noted that QE2 could have adverse
effects. For example, Plosser has expressed concern that if
the FOMC undertakes QE2 and the actions are ineffective,
it could damage the “Fed’s credibility and possibly erode the
effectiveness of our future actions to ensure price stability.”
He suggests that QE2 might also raise concerns that “the
Fed is seeking to monetize the deficit [which] might make
it more difficult to return to normal policy” in the future. ■
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